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4	Anonymous Bluetooth Probes for
5	Airport Security Line
6	Service Time Measurement:
7	The Indianapolis Pilot Deployment
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45 **ABSTRACT**

46

47 An anonymous Bluetooth tracking system was deployed at the new Indianapolis 48 International Airport from May 8 to June 2, 2009 to measure the time spent waiting in 49 security screening lines, transiting the security screening checkpoint and walking to 50 Concourse B. The maximum security checkpoint queue was observed to be on 51 Monday mornings at approximately 0600 when it could take passengers up to twenty 52 minutes to transit the security queue, screening process and walk to Concourse B. 53 Depending upon the day of the week, this approach was demonstrated to sample 54 between 5% and 6.8% of the passengers. This modest sample size provides a much 55 more robust measurement of screening times then the current system of manually 56 passing out time stamped cards as passengers enter the queue and collecting them 57 when they pass through the magnetometer. The paper concludes by suggesting this 58 system could provide important information to managers to more effectively allocate 59 scarce resources on both a local and national level as well as providing the traveling 60 public with information they need in order to know how much time they should 61 allocate for transiting the security screening process at an airport. 62

64 **INTRODUCTION**

65 Obtaining both historical and real-time measurement of the time that it takes

66 passengers to transit through both the queue and security screening process at

67 airport checkpoints is of interest to a variety of stakeholders. For example,

68 passengers would benefit from this information by allowing them to schedule

appropriate slack time in their arrival at the airport. Also, managers responsible for

70 staffing security checkpoints at a specific airport would have quantitative information

to schedule personnel necessary to respond to daily, seasonal, and special

72 event/holiday traffic. On a national scale, quantitative data for security screening

transit time for major airports across the country would allow government officials to

be more agile in responding to changes in airport origin-destination traffic patterns.

Additional intangible benefits would also accrue to the travelling public by managers

reduce security checkpoint delays that occur

77 due to shifting travel patterns.

80 CURRENT MEASUREMENT TECHNIQUES

81 There are two primary techniques used for scheduling and assessing staffing 82 resources at security checkpoints: checkpoint passenger counts and manual 83 measurement of queue time. Figure 1 is an example of historical checkpoint 84 passenger counts. This plot illustrates that most of the passengers pass through the 85 security screening between 3am and 9pm, with the largest peak around 6am. These 86 historical volumes can be augmented by airline reservation data to capture unusual 87 demand patterns associated with holidays and large sporting events. However, 88 these volumes only provide first order management tools because there are 89 frequently differing demographics on different travel days and at different times. For 90 example, there are differences in average passenger screening times between a 91 business traveler and a family travelling on vacation. Screening times also vary due 92 to factors such as amount of clothing worn by passengers in different region with 93 different weather and temperature conditions.

94

95 Historically, this security volume data has been augmented by occasionally passing 96 out time-stamped cards to passengers entering a security line queue and collecting 97 them when they pass through the magnetometer. This technique is labor intensive 98 for both the task of distributing/collecting the cards and the processing duties after 99 they are collected. To obtain robust statistical estimates of average passenger 100 transit, relatively large samples are necessary (1), but rarely collected for any 101 substantive period. Consequently, there has been no development of planning level 102 service time models that explicitly consider important factors such as passenger 103 volume, regional characteristics, checkpoint layouts, and/or weather to model modern 104 security checkpoints.

105

106 It would be desirable to implement real-time security transit time so that wait times
107 could be directly measured for management and customer relations. The longer term
108 benefit of deploying such systems would be a rich data set to develop accurate
109 queuing models, such as have been developed for other transportation areas such as
110 highway operations(2).

111

113 MEASUREMENT TECHNOLOGIES

114 There are a variety of technologies that can be used for real-time measurement of 115 transit time in transportation systems, but in general they all fall into the category of 116 matching unique identifiers between two points. For example, one of the oldest 117 methods for estimating transit time between two points is to use two observers 118 stationed at two different points along a route with each writing down license plates 119 and the time that a vehicle pass a point on the highway (Figure 2a) (3, 4). After the 120 data recording is completed and observers return to the office, the license plates are 121 "matched" and the difference in observation times is recorded. This basic technique 122 was first developed in the 1940's, but has been enhanced over the years to include 123 the use of computer image processing to automatically capture the license plate or 124 other unique identifiers such as electronic ID numbers associated with toll tags or 125 electromagnetic characteristics of vehicles.

126

127 Recently, agencies have extended these this technique further and begun using 128 roadside devices to capture the discoverable unique 48 bit MAC addresses 129 associated with discoverable Bluetooth devices in the vehicles such as cell phones 130 (Figure 2b), GPS devices, mp3 players, hearing aids, and hands free devices (5). 131 Not all vehicles have discoverable Bluetooth devices, but in general it has been 132 reported that 5%-12% of the vehicles have one or more such discoverable devices 133 on board (6). This sample size is large enough to develop very accurate estimates of 134 segment travel time. Figure 3 illustrates the type of travel time information that is 135 typically collected by highway agencies to identify periods of the day were long 136 queues are developing and establishing proactive work zone management strategies 137 and public communication procedures. The travel time plot shown in Figure 3 shows 138 travel time measured over a 20 mile period in the Southbound direction of I-65 in 139 Northwest Indiana. The increased traffic volume on Friday and Sunday show that the 140 travel time over that 20 mile segment increases by over 1 hour during those periods. 141 On Monday's, the travel time through the construction zone increases by 142 approximately 40 minutes during the afternoon period. 143

145 INDIANAPOLIS AIRPORT CASE STUDY

In an airport environment, the travel time measurement problem is essentially the
same as highways, except it is the transit time of pedestrians (not vehicles) that is of
interest and the distances are typically much shorter. Figure 4 illustrates the location
of two reference points that can be used for measuring the transit time through a
security queue, security screening, and pedestrian path to the sterile Concourse B
area at Indianapolis International Airport.

152

153 In this study, equipment similar to that used for roadside vehicle detection was placed 154 at the locations shown in Figure 5 and Figure 6. However, this study used lower 155 powered Class II Bluetooth radio receivers that had an approximate range of 10 156 meters as opposed to 100 meters (Table 1). Figure 7 illustrates how these two 157 monitoring locations can be used to capture the unique identifier "00:21:06:8C:7A" of 158 an anonymous cell phone (Figure 2b) as the passenger carrying the cell phone 159 enters the security line at 08:49, waits in the security screening line, is screened, and 160 then enters Concourse B at 08:59.

161

162 Figure 8 illustrates how the duration of this passenger transit time can be plotted 163 throughout the day to characterize security line wait times. Of particular note is the 164 contrast in the pattern of travel time shown in Figure 3 vs. the pattern of travel times 165 shown in Figure 8. In the Interstate Highway example, most of the motorists join a 166 single queue, except for a few that divert at exits and travel on adjacent local roads. 167 However, in an airport, there are several "routes" through the security checkpoint. In 168 the case of Concourse B at Indianapolis Airport at the time of the study, there were 169 separate lines for

- Expert travelers
- Families
- The commercial service "Clear" (which has since ceased operation at IND)
- Airline crews

Furthermore, additional "noise" in the passenger security transit time plots for airports
occurs because not all passengers take a direct, linear path through security to their
gate. Therefore, there are some outlier travel times that are not representative of
transit time through the security screening checkpoint. For example, from the pattern

of travel times plotted in Figure 8 it obvious that the security line transit times larger
than 20 minutes after 0900 are not representative of a passenger that proceeds
directly through the security screening area to Concourse B.

181

As a result, the travel times shown in Figure 8 require some judgment in interpreting typical transit times. However, it is fairly clear that the security transit time peaks around 0600 at about 20 minutes, and then tapers off to a maximum time of 10-15 minutes throughout the rest of the day. The actual time waiting in the security line is considerably less because the plot shown in Figure 8 includes the time required for passengers to pass through security, reassemble their belongings, put their shoes on, and walk approximately 200 feet to pass the sensor on Concourse B (Figure 4).

189

Although daily security travel time plots like the one shown in Figure 8 are helpful,examining them in the context of passenger volumes can provide additional insight.

Figure 9 shows the passenger volumes for Concourse B security screening duringthe period this pilot study was conducted and Figure 10 shows the corresponding

travel time plots over the same period. A couple of trends are apparent whenexamining both of these plots:

- Figure 10 shows the peak security transit time is approximately 20 minutes
 and occurs on Monday May 11 during the morning peak. Figure 11 shows a
 detailed hourly comparison between the passenger count and the security
 transit time on May 11 with obvious correlation between the passenger count
 and security travel time.
- There are approximately 30% more passengers departing on Monday May 25
 (Memorial Day), but the typical security transit time is less than 15 minutes
 throughout the day.
- 204

Using the passenger counts and the number of uniquely matched Bluetooth MAC
addresses, Figure 12 shows that between 5% and 6.8% of the passengers have
discoverable Bluetooth devices on any given day. This is slightly lower than
observed in a typical freeway traffic stream, but still large enough to very accurately
characterize the transit time through an airport security checkpoint.

211 **PRIVACY ISSUES**

212 The MAC address shown in this research was for one of the paper co-authors. In a 213 full deployment, consideration needs to be given to designing the data collection and 214 destruction procedures. For example, the Indiana Department of Transportation has 215 recorded over 1.4 million travel times for the construction work zone shown in Figure 216 3, but has based all of their travel time calculations on MAC address that have had 3 217 digits (octets) deleted. This is analogous to not recording some of the digits on a 218 vehicle license plate. When such a clipping procedure is implemented at the data 219 collection point, there is sufficient uniqueness in the data set to obtain very reliable 220 travel time estimates, but not enough information to be able to prove the presence of 221 a device with a specific MAC address at a particular time. More complex hashing 222 algorithms could also be developed.

223

Furthermore, once a match has been made between the two checkpoints shown in Figure 4, there is no need for an airport to maintain the MAC address and it can be discarded after a few hours.

227

228 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH

229 This paper demonstrated that technology currently used to measure travel time along 230 freeways and signalized arterials can be easily adapted to an airport environment to 231 measure the transit time through a security checkpoint. The only technical 232 modification was that Class II (instead of Class I) receivers were used to reduce the 233 sampling radii of the Bluetooth monitoring devices. In comparison to highway 234 environments, the 5-6.8% of passengers with discoverable Bluetooth devices on their 235 persons was slightly lower, but large enough to accurately characterized passenger 236 transit time through security.

237

This technology is currently deployed in highway environments for less than \$5000 per installation. With the potential to collect continuous security time transit time data, this has the potential to provide managers with information to most effectively allocate scarce screening resources at both the local airport level and national level.

- 243 This pilot study was conducted at the new Indianapolis Airport Terminal that was
- 244 opened in November 2008 with highly structured security checkpoints. This
- technology could be readily deployed at other airports throughout the country as well,
- but might require site specific use of directional antennas to accommodate nuances
- of older airport terminals.
- 248
- 249 Lastly, long term collection of i) passenger counts, ii) security transit times, and iii)
- 250 security checkpoint configurations, and iv) security checkpoint staffing levels would
- allow the development of higher fidelity quantitative models relating passenger
- counts with security transit times (Figure 11).
- 253

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



Figure 1: Concourse B passenger volume for May 11, 2009.



a) Visible plate number



b) Electronically visible device

address

Figure 2: Examples of unique identifiers that can be recorded to measure segment transit time.

286




Figure 3: Example travel time through an Interstate Highway construction zone with

significant queuing.




Figure 4: Reference points for measuring transit time through Concourse B security screening.




Figure 5: Location of Bluetooth monitoring station prior to passengers entering Concourse B security line.





Figure 6: Location of Bluetooth monitoring station after passengers clear Concourse B security screening.



Figure 7: Example measurement of a 10 minute transit from the entrance to Concourse B security screening area at 8:49 to the secure area of Concourse B at 8:59.








Figure 9: Concourse B Passenger volume from May 10 through June 2, 2009.



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screening area to the secure area of Concourse B during period May 8 through June 2, 2009.








Figure 12: Percentage of Concourse B Passenger volume per day of passengers
with discoverable Bluetooth devices matched between Bluetooth monitoring station
from May 10 through June 1, 2009.

335 Table 1: Categories of Bluetooth device power and approximate range.

Class	Maximum Power	Typical Operating Range
Class 1	100mW (20dBm)	~100 meters
Class 2	2.5mW (4dBm)	~10 meters
Class 3	1mW (0dBm)	~1 meter